Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

State of Utah v. Robert E. Horner : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Robert E. Horner; Pro Se.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Horner, No. 900059 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2461

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

; -;',-w '"''"1*"T

•£A—*.
IN THE UTAH

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

t

ROBERT E. HORNER,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900059-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF TWO COUNTS OF
UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, PRESIDING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

ROBERT E. HORNER
P.O. Box 655
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Pro s e

DEC 31992)
MrO
Ut-

f-n

„m

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900059-CA

v.
Category No. 2

ROBERT E. HORNER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF TWO COUNTS OF
UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, PRESIDING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

ROBERT E. HORNER
P.O. Box 655
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Pro se

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ii
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS
OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHES THAT HE WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE CRIMINAL INTENT

4

A.

Standard of Review

4

B.

Entrapment

6

C.

Sufficiency of Evidence on Intent

7

POINT II
CONCLUSION

DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HE WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL. . . .

7
12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Bellamy v. Coadell. 952 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir.)/
vacated on reh'g. 974 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1992)
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah
App. 1987)

8-11
6

Solina v. United States. 709 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir.
1983)

10

State v. Binaham. 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984)

12

State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989)

2, 7

State v. Colonna. 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988)

11

State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)

7

State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992)

5

State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991)

12

State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991)

2

State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991)

11

State v. Martin. 713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1986)

5

State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989)

5

State v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771 (Utah 1985)

6

State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991)

5

State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)

2

State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986)

1/6

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

2, 7

United States v. Aiello. 900 F.2d 528 (2nd Cir.
1990)
United States v. Cancilla. 725 F.2d 867 (2nd
Cir. 1984)

ii

10, 11
10

United States v. Novak. 903 F.2d 883 (2nd Cir.
1990)

10

Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir.
1988)

10, 11
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp. 1988)

1, 2, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992)

1

Utah R. App. P. 11

7

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROBERT E. HORNER,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900059-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of two counts of
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are:
1.

Does the evidence establish that defendant was

entrapped as a matter of law?
When presented with an entrapment claim, a reviewing
court will affirm a conviction unless the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict, leaves no reasonable
doubt that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law.

State

v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986).
2.

Was defendant denied effective assistance of

counsel at trial based solely on the disbarment of his attorney

after defendant's trial?
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim
generally presents a mixed question of fact and law.
Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

State v.

However, when as here

the issue is presented for the first time on appeal, without an
evidentiary hearing having been conducted below, the
ineffectiveness claim presents a question of law reviewed on the
record of the underlying trial.
1027 (Utah 1991).

See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d

A defendant must show both that counsel

rendered deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and
that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's
deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been
different.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with two counts of unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), or agreeing,
consenting, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance
(cocaine), a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988) (R. 10-12).
Before trial, defendant moved the trial court to
determine whether he was entrapped as a matter of fact and law
2

(R. 36). The court, concluding that it could not find entrapment
as a matter of law, ruled that defendant would have to present
the issue to the jury (Transcr. of Nov. 30, 1989 hearing at 98;
R. 48).
A jury convicted defendant of both counts, implicitly
rejecting his entrapment defense (R. 103-104).

The trial court

sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years
at the Utah State Prison on both counts, fined him a total of
$10,000 plus a 25% surcharge, and ordered him to pay $1,060 in
restitution (R. 121-22).

However, the court stayed execution of

the prison sentence and placed defendant on thirty-six months'
probation (id,.).
Defendant's trial counsel filed an appeal but failed to
file a brief.

This resulted in dismissal of the appeal (R. 143).

However, this Court granted defendant's motion to reinstate his
appeal, which is now before the Court on defendant's pro se
brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statement of facts beyond that which appears above in
the Statement of the Case is not necessary to the resolution of
the issues presented on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's failure to provide this Court with a trial
transcript precludes consideration of his claims that he was
entrapped as a matter of law and that the evidence is
insufficient to prove he had the requisite criminal intent.

3

To prevail on either claim, defendant must marshal all
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then show how this
marshalled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Also,
the rules of appellate procedure require that defendant support
all factual assertions in his brief with references to the
record.

He fails to satisfy either of these requirements due to

the absence of a trial transcript.
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
lacks merit.

He neither identifies deficient performance by his

trial counsel nor demonstrates any prejudice flowing therefrom.
Furthermore, he does not establish a factual basis upon which
this Court could find a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment;
the mere fact that trial counsel was disbarred after defendant's
trial does not constitute per

se ineffective assistance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHES THAT HE WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER
OF LAW OR THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE CRIMINAL INTENT
Under the heading "Entrapment," defendant argues both
that he was entrapped as a matter of law and that the evidence is
insufficient to prove he acted with the requisite criminal
intent.

Br. of Appellant at 6-11.

His argument fails in both

respects.
A.

Standard of Review

As noted above, prior to trial defendant moved the
trial court to determine the entrapment question (R. 36). See
-4-

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1990).

After hearing evidence, the

court concluded that it could not find entrapment as a matter of
law and ruled that defendant would have to present the issue to
the jury (Transcr. of Nov. 30, 1989 hearing at 98; R. 48). At
trial, defendant presented an entrapment defense (see Jury
Instructions Nos. 11 and 12 (R. 89-90)), which the jury
implicitly rejected when it convicted him.

Under these

circumstances, defendant's entrapment argument on appeal is
considered a challenge to the jury verdict, even though he argues
that he was entrapped "as a matter of law."

See, e.g., State v.

Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 499, 501 (Utah 1989); State v. Martin, 713
P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1986).
When presented with an insufficient evidence claim, an
appellate court "'review[s] the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict'" and will reverse a jury conviction "'only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted.'" State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah
1992) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)).
Furthermore, when challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, the "defendant must 'marshal all evidence

supporting

the jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence
is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict.'"

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d

470, 472 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d

-5-

1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991)).
When reviewing an entrapment claim, an appellate court
will affirm the conviction unless the evidence leaves no
reasonable doubt that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of
law.

State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986).
B•

Entrapment

Defendant has not provided this Court with a trial
transcript.

The appellate record contains only a transcript of

the pretrial entrapment hearing.

Thus, in challenging the jury's

verdict and its implicit rejection of his entrapment defense,
defendant does not satisfy the marshalling requirement or
referred to the record as required by rule 24(e), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, see Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d
1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987) ("'This Court need not, and will not,
consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the
record.'" (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)).

At bottom, defendant's failure to

provide a trial transcript on appeal precludes consideration of
his claim that the evidence demonstrates entrapment as a matter
of law.

State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)

(defendant's failure to provide trial transcript on appeal
precluded consideration of his claim of error).1
1

Defendant's failure to provide a trial transcript on
appeal illustrates one of the hazards of pursuing an appeal
without counsel, as defendant has chosen to do here. He
obviously is not aware of the applicable standards of review, the
requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, or the
importance of providing a complete record on appeal.
Although the record contains correspondence between
defendant and the court reporter which refers to trial
-6-

C.

Sufficiency of Evidence on Intent

Defendant's failure to provide a trial transcript on
appeal also precludes consideration of his argument that the
evidence is insufficient to prove he had the requisite criminal
intent.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HE WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result would have been different.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
886, 893 (Utah 1986).

A "[defendant must prove that specific,

identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.

The claim may not be

speculative, but must be a demonstrative reality[.]M
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).

State v.
Here,

defendant fails to meet either prong of the Strickland standard.
Without identifying any specific acts or omissions of
trial counsel that would constitute deficient performance, or
alleging prejudice from any deficient performance, defendant
argues that he received per

se ineffective assistance because his

transcripts (R. 183-84), there is no indication that defendant
made any effort to comply with the transcript filing requirements
of rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court fully
advised him of those requirements in a letter dated April 20,
1992 (R. 187-88).
-7-

counsel was disbarred after defendant's trial.

Defendant does

not disclose, and it appears he does not know, the reason for
counsel's disbarment.

See Br. of Appellant at 13 ("Whatever this

attorney was doing during the latter half of 1989, it led to his
dis-barmen [sic] . . . . ) .
Defendant cites a panel decision of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, Bellamy v. Cocrdell, 952 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir.),
vacated on reh'q, 974 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1992) (en banc), as
authority for application of a per se rule.

He fails to note or

discuss the en banc Second Circuit opinion which vacated the
panel opinion and concluded that, under the facts of the case,
the per

se rule did not apply.

See Bellamy v. Coqdell, 974 F.2d

302 (2nd Cir. 1992) (en banc).

However, even if this Court were

to accept the rejected analysis of the panel decision in Bellamy,
the facts of that case, as outlined by the panel, are clearly
distinguishable.2
There, defense counsel was charged with professional
misconduct prior to Bellamy's trial for murder and criminal
possession of a weapon.

952 F.2d at 627.

In answering the

charges, counsel implicitly admitted that due to physical and
mental difficulties he was incapable of practicing law. JCd. at
628.

Nevertheless, having promised the disciplinary committee

that he would not go to trial without the assistance of another
attorney, counsel proceeded alone to represent Bellamy at trial
without disclosing the misconduct charges or his admitted

2

A strong dissent, which adopted the panel's analysis, was
filed in the en banc decision. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 309-13*

-8-

incapacity to his client.

Ibid.

Shortly after being convicted,

Bellamy learned of his counsel's problems —

which then included

an indefinite suspension as an attorney based on counsel's
incapacity to practice law —

and sought relief from both his

conviction and sentence on the ground that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Ibid.

Ultimately, the

Second Circuit panel granted Bellamy a writ of habeas corpus,
holding that his case was within a small class of cases where the
Strickland two-pronged test does not apply and ineffective
assistance is presumed.

.Id. at 631.

Following the analysis in several prior Second Circuit
cases, the panel reasoned that the facts of Bellamy's case
constituted a per

se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel because "the defect which led to [counsel's] suspension
was 'a serious substantive flaw, [such as] . . . a demonstrated
inability to meet the threshold criteria of competence in the
law.'"

Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883,

888 (2nd Cir. 1990)) (second alteration in original).
said:
Had [counsel] been suspended solely for the
financial charges originally brought against
him, . . . we might well have upheld
Bellamy's conviction. But when an attorney
is admittedly incapable of preparing for a
hearing to be held a week or two before a
criminal trial, when that incapacity is the
ground for suspension from practice shortly
after the trial, when that suspension would
almost certainly have occurred prior to the
criminal trial but for an unfulfilled promise
to be assisted by competent counsel during
the trial, and when the attorney's client is
ignorant of all of this, we feel obligated by
our cases to hold on such unusual facts that
the client has been denied the effective
-9-

The panel

assistance of counsel guaranteed a defendant
by the Constitution.
Ibid.

(Of course, the en banc decision rejected this reasoning.)
Defendant makes no claim that during trial his attorney

had a disabling condition like that present in Bellamy.

Nor does

he claim there was a "serious substantive flaw" similar to that
present in other Second Circuit cases, relied on by the panel in
Bellamy, where a per

se Sixth Amendment violation was found:

United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2nd Cir. 1990) (defense
counsel, although licensed to practice law during defendant's
trial, had fraudulently obtained his license); United States v.
Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2nd Cir. 1984) (defense counsel, unknown
to defendant, participated in criminal conduct related to the
conduct for which defendant was convicted; this conflict of
interest denied defendant his right to counsel at trial); Solina
v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1983) (defense counsel
was unlicensed and lack of license was based on failure to seek
license or denial for reason going to legal ability).
Indeed, defendant's case may be similar to two cases
the Bellamy panel distinguished.

In Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848

F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1988), the court refused to find a per

se

Sixth Amendment violation where counsel was disbarred after
representing the defendant at a hearing to determine whether the
defendant's confession was voluntary.

The attorney was disbarred

for misappropriating client funds and for failing to represent
clients after accepting fees.

848 F.2d at 378. As the Bellamy

panel noted, M[N]either of these bases of disbarment called into
question the attorney's competence to practice law at the time he
-10-

was representing Waterhouse. . . . It was therefore not
considered pertinent to the defendant's representation at the
confession hearing that his attorney was disbarred."

952 F.2d at

631.
Likewise, the Second Circuit refused to find a per

se

Sixth Amendment violation in United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d
528 (2nd Cir. 1990), where defense counsel "was under
investigation by the Organized Crime Strike Force for the Eastern
District of New York before and during the proceedings against
the defendant."

Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 631.

"[A]s in Waterhouse,

'[the attorney's] purported crimes were totally unrelated to the
crimes for which [the defendant] was being tried'[;] [t]here was
similarly no evidence that the attorney was incompetent to
practice law."

Ibid, (quoting Waterhouse, 900 F.2d at 531)

(first alteration added).
Without identifying the basis for his attorney's
disbarment, defendant is unable to avail himself of the Bellamy
panel's holding.

Contrary to the facts of Bellamy, defendant's

situation may be like that of the defendants in Waterhouse and
Aiello, where there was no Sixth Amendment violation.

Defendant

simply fails to carry his burden of showing that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at trial based solely on the
post-trial disbarment of his attorney.

As the en banc decision

in Bellamy makes clear, the per se rule is applied in very
limited circumstances and "'without enthusiasm.'"

974 F.2d at

306 (quoting Aiello, 900 F.2d at 532).
Finally, defendant also alleges that his counsel (1)

-11-

promised him that the "case was 'in the bag' because the [trial
judge] was [counsel's] former law partner," and (2) during trial
discussed with the prosecutor possible employment as counsel for
"the Special Drug Task Force."

Br. of Appellant at 14.

Insofar

as defendant intends for these allegations to form the basis of
an ineffectiveness claim, they are not supported by any record
evidence and therefore cannot be considered.

See State v. Jones,

823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991) (because nothing in the record
supported defendant's claim of a Miranda violation, defendant had
failed to carry his burden of establishing ineffective assistance
of counsel); State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Utah 1988)
("Defendant may not prevail on ineffectiveness claims where he
has raised only the possibility of ineffective assistance of
counsel but failed to offer evidence thereon.");

State v. Hovt,

806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991) ("The record before us is
inadequate to resolve defendant's claim that counsel failed to
object to certain evidence . • • . " ) .

See also State v. Bingham,

684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This Court will not rule on matters
outside the trial court record.").
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
A

affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3

day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
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